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Abstract 
The future institutional environment for the co-existence of genetically modified (GM) crops, 
conventional crops and organic crops in Europe combines measures of ex-ante regulation and 
ex-post liability rules. Against this background we ask the following two questions: How does 
ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability under irreversibility and uncertainty affect the 
adoption of GM crops? What are the implications for regional agglomeration of GM and non-
GM crops? Ex-ante regulations and ex-post liabilities for using GM crops will induce 
additional costs. These costs are modelled in a classical way. The model is advanced by 
including irreversibility and uncertainty and taking into account transaction costs of 
negotiating possible solutions with neighbouring farmers which are assumed to be partially 
irreversible. The results show that the design of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability 
increases the value of waiting and results in less immediate adoption of the GM technology. 
Additionally, the rules and regulations in the EU do provide incentives for the regional 
agglomeration of GM and non-GM crops that are mainly driven by the irreversibility effect of 
the ex-ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs. 
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1 Introduction 
The institutional environment for the co-existence of genetically modified (GM) crops, 
conventional crops and organic crops in Europe combines measures of ex-ante regulation and 
ex-post liability rules. Recognising Europe’s heterogeneity in farm structures, crop patterns 
and legal environments, the European Commission decided to follow the principle of 
subsidiarity and states that “measures for coexistence should be developed and implemented 
by the Member States.” (Commission of the European Communities 2003). It can be expected 
that the Member States will develop a variety of different measures that will have a profound 
impact on the adoption rate of GM crops. The discussion on co-existence and private liability 
for GM-technology, however, is not limited to Europe. There is an ongoing debate in the 
United States, Canada, New Zealand and other countries (see e.g. Smyth, Khachatourians and 
Phillips 2002; Kershen 2002; Conner 2003).  
Against this background we ask the following two questions: How does ex-ante regulation 
and ex-post liability under irreversibility and uncertainty affect the adoption of GM crops? 
What are the implications for regional agglomeration of GM and non-GM crops?  
Ex-ante regulations and ex-post liabilities governing the planting of GM crops will add 
additional costs for adopters in comparison to a situation where GM crops are treated the 
same as non-GM crops. These costs are modelled in a classical way starting with the approach 
by Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson (1990) which is advanced by including irreversibility and 
uncertainty as in Soregaroli and Wesseler (2005). In this paper we introduce a different cost 
function that takes into account transaction costs of negotiating possible solutions with 
neighbouring farmers as suggested by Beckmann (2005). This new model is our main 
contribution. We also show how the rules and regulations affect the comparative advantage of 
different farm types and how they set incentives for regional agglomeration of farm types 
(GM or non-GM farms).  
2 Assessing the Problem of Co-Existence 
The problem of co-existence is a classical “problem of social costs”. Farmers who plant GM 
crops may cause negative (or positive) external effects to non-GM or organic farmers by cross 
pollination through pollen drift or other forms of admixture.  
The pollination, in principle, can be two sided. GM crops may affect non-GM crops but 
non-GM crops may also affect GM crops. It is important to note here that the same physical 
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effect, i.e. pollen flow, can have different economic impacts, depending on the institutional 
setting.  
The institutional and regulatory setting defines the rules of what is or is not to be called 
GM. In this case, this largely depends on threshold levels and it is not surprising that the 
definition of the threshold is subject to a strong political debate. In the EU the current food-
labelling threshold is 0.9% for GM food (Commission of the European Communities 2005)1.  
These specificities, the impact of the institutional setting and the threshold level for 
defining GM food, will be considered for developing a model for co-existence. 
2.1 A Simple Model Defining Co-Existence 
We start with a simple model for co-existence by following Beckmann and Wesseler (2005). 
Think about a region that consists of a number of farms i= 1,…,k, with risk-neutral farmers 
which show similar cropping patterns and share several borderlines and initially grow only 
one type of crops. Further, assume initially only non-GM crops are grown. The regional value 
of non-GM production, , is then given by  NV
N N NV P Y C= − N
)
G
                                                
 (1a) 
(
1 1
i i i
k k
N N N N N i
i i
V v p y c
= =
= = −∑ ∑  (1b) 
where , , and  are the respective price, quantity and cost vectors for non-GM 
products at the regional level. Further,  indicates the farm level value of non-GM 
production and , ,  are the respective farm level price, quantity and cost vectors. 
NP NY NC
iN
v
iN
p
iN
y
iN
c
If all farmers in the region were to shift to the GM crop variety, e.g. from corn to Bt-corn2, 
regulations to ensure non-GM farming are not necessary and the regional value of GM crop 
production, , is given by: GV
G G GV P Y C= −  (2a) 
 
1  It should be noted here that for organic farming no threshold has been decided yet. The European 
Commission proposes a 0.9% threshold level as well, which is heavily debated. 
2  Bt corn has been genetically engineered to contain Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), a species of soil-borne 
bacteria. When a susceptible insect tries to feed on a GM crop expressing the Bt protein, it stops feeding and 
will die as a result of the binding of the Bt toxin to its gut wall.  
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with , , and  as the respective price, quantity and cost vectors of GM crops at the 
regional level. Again represents the farm level value of GM production and , ,  
are the respective price, quantity and cost vectors for GM crops at the individual farm level.
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Since it is expected that consumers are willing to pay a price premium for GM-free food, 
we assume further that the farm gate price of non-GM crops is universally higher than for GM 
crops4. This assumption is represented by the equation (3): 
, 1,...,
i iN G
p p i> ∀ =  (3) 
If the farm gate prices of GM crops are assumed to be lower than for non-GM crops, GM 
crops must allow for sufficient cost reductions or yield increases in order to be attractive to be 
grown. At least for one farmer the value of GM crop production must exceed the value of 
non-GM crops, , otherwise GM crops will not be grown and vice versa.  
iG N
v v>
Assume now, that the whole group of k farmers could be divided into two different 
subgroups. The first group, , say group A, has a comparative advantage in non-GM 
crop production, ; the second group 
h,,i …1=
N Giv v≥ k,,hki …−= , say group B, has a comparative 
advantage in GM crop production, . For notational clarity, we indicate farms 
belonging to group A with  with the small letter a and farms belonging to group B 
with  with the small letter b. Different regions may show a different population 
structure with regard to the type of farms. One region may be populated mostly with type A 
farmers, another region mostly with type B farmers, and a third region may be equally 
populated by type A and B farmers. If the latter is the case, then the co-existence of both farm 
types, if it can be established cost free, will be socially preferable compared to the status quo 
and to the unified adoption of GM crops, since the value of co-existence in the region, VC, 
will exceed the value of uniform adoption as represented by equation (4): 
iG N
v v>
i
N
                                                
h,,i …1=
k,,hki …−=
1
,
a b
h k
N G G
a b k h
VC v v V V
= = −
= + >∑ ∑  (4) 
 
3  Please note, refuge areas to control for pest resistance are implicitly considered in this model as part of the 
costs of planting the GM crops. 
4  However, there is no reason to believe that this should always be the case. It is also possible that the price of 
GM-food exceeds the price for non-GM products. In the following, however, we will not consider this case. 
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2.2 Co-Existence, Economic Damage and Technical Measures 
Equation (4) assumes that there is no co-existence problem. However, if accidental pollen 
transfer from GM crops to non-GM crops occurs, the non-GM farmer may face the risk that 
his non-GM crops will be contaminated with pollen from GM crops. If, as a consequence, he 
cannot sell his product at a price premium, he will face an economic loss or damage, da. The 
occurrence and magnitude of the economic damages is influenced by a number of factors 
represented in equation (5a). 
0 if 
( ) if 
a
a
a
a a a
a
N G
N
a
N G
N G N
N
Y
T
y
d
Y
p p y T
y
ψ
ψ
⎧ <⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ − ≥⎪⎩
 (5a) 
1
h
a
a
D d
=
= ∑  (5b) 
The occurrence of the damage at the individual non-GM farm, , is determined by (1) the 
quantity of GM crops grown in the region  which is an expression for the current rate of 
adoption, (2) the diffusion coefficient 
ad
GY
aN
ψ  that indicates the farm and crop specific impact of 
pollen drifts from GM crops to non-GM crops and (3) the threshold, T, for the good being 
defined as GM or non-GM. As it was already argued, the threshold T is an important factor 
for the occurrence of economic damage. Economic damage occurs only if the fraction of GM 
crops in non-GM crops exceeds the threshold level. The magnitude of the damage is 
influenced by (1) the price difference, 
aN G
p p
a
−  and the (2) quantity  of non-GM 
products affected. The damage, of course, is zero if the quantity of GM crops or non-GM 
crops is zero, if the price difference is zero or if the contamination is always below the 
threshold level. The total damage in the region, D, is the sum of the farm level damages, d
aN
y
a. 
The diffusion coefficient is of specific importance here. This coefficient can be influenced 
by different technical measures and management practices, i.e. by isolation distances between 
fields, buffer zones, pollen barriers, crop rotation systems or by genetic use restricted 
technologies (GURT) (e.g. van de Wiel, Groot, and den Nijs 2005). These management 
practices are either related to border management or to the spatial and temporal co-ordination 
of agricultural activities and can be subsumed as fencing activities. However, changing the 
diffusion coefficient requires the introduction of management practices resulting in additional 
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costs. If we denote  as the farm-level management practices and  as the farm-level 
fencing costs of these practices, the following relationships are assumed: 
im if
,( , )i i i k i km mψ ψ ∉=  (6a) 
(( , , ,ii i i N G N Gi ))f f m y y Y Y=  (6b) 
1 1 1
k h k h
i a
i a b
bF f f
−
= = =
= = +∑ ∑ ∑ f
1
 (6c) 
The diffusion coefficient at the farm level, ψi, is influenced by the farm management practices 
 but also by the management practices of all other farms. Let’s take the example of the 
buffer zone as one management system and two neighbouring farms. The diffusion coefficient 
can be reduced if the buffer zone is implemented by a farm that grows non-GM crops and it 
will be reduced even more if the GM farm establishes a buffer zone as well. However, 
equation (6a) indicates that because of the interdependencies in management there is a 
coordination problem between the management practices adopted by different farms. The 
costs of establishing the management and fencing systems as in equation (6b) are not only 
dependent on the management practices of the farmer, m
im
i, but also indirectly on the quantity 
of non-GM (or GM) crops grown on the farm and the quantity of non-GM crops and GM 
crops grown in the region. Just to give an example, it makes a difference if a non-GM farm is 
surrounded by one GM farmer and four non-GM farmers or by five GM farmers. Finally, the 
management and fencing costs in the region are the sum of the individual management and 
fencing costs as indicated by equation (6c). Through coordinated action farmers may reduce 
damage and/or fencing costs. They can agree on voluntary solutions such as different rotation 
practices, planting times or buffer zones. These co-ordination activities are not cost free 
because of transaction costs. For the simplification of the exposition we assume transaction 
costs to be considered under fencing and damage costs. 
Considering the additional costs discussed above equation (4) has to be rewritten: 
1 1 1 1
, ;      , 0
i i
h k k k k k
G N i i G N i i
i i k h i i i i
VC v v d f V V d f
= = − = = = =
= + − − > ≥∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (7) 
Now, the regional value of co-existence is the sum of the values of GM and non-GM crops at 
the farm level minus the sum of damage and/or fencing costs and equation (7) reflects the sum 
of the individual decisions.  
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2.3 Liability Rights and Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
To incorporate different distributions of property rights in the form of liability rights in the 
analysis, let us denote  as the farm level co-existence value of non-GM crops and  as 
the farm level co-existence value of GM crops. We introduce a superscript ℓ that indicates if 
the GM farmer is liable for the damages he causes and n if he is not. We assume further that 
there are no additional costs except for the damage costs of holding the GM farmer liable for 
cross pollination and hence there is no uncertainty involved in proving admixture. Under this 
setting two different liability systems are discussed.  
iN
vc
iG
vc
2.3.1 GM farmer not liable 
If farmers have the unrestricted right to grow GM crops and are not liable, every farmer 
switching to GM technology will reduce the value of non-GM crops on fields in the 
neighbourhood due to possible economic damages from the GM field. The co-existence value 
of non-GM farming of farm i, , will be reduced if neighbouring farms plant GM crops by 
the expected damage  and/or by the costs 
i
n
Nvc
id if  of the management and fencing practices that 
prevent potential damages. The co-existence value of GM farming, however, does not change 
for farmer i:  
i i
n
N N ivc v d f= − − i
iG
i
n
N
i
 (8a) 
i
n
Gvc v=  (8b) 
Farmer i will now choose to plant GM crops, if . The distribution of rights and 
therefore costs and benefits as indicated by equation (8a) and (8b) can be assumed not only to 
influence distribution of economic benefits but also technology adaptation and investments in 
the management and fencing system. Under the circumstances described, a GM farmer has no 
incentive to invest in management and fencing practices that prevent damages. The non-GM 
farmer, however, has an incentive to invest in management systems that prevent damages. 
Cost minimizing behaviour requires that the non-GM farmer introduces management 
technologies up to the level where the marginal costs of these technologies are equal to the 
avoided marginal damages. If the damage and/or the management and fencing costs exceed 
the incremental value of non-GM crops, 
i
n
Gvc vc>
ii i N G
d f v v+ > − , the farmer will stop non-GM 
production. Thus, this type of liability rights increases the adoption rate of GM technology. 
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However, as long as the equation does not hold for all farmers in group A, non-GM crop 
farming will not disappear. 
2.3.2 GM farmer liable 
The costs are distributed in a different way if the potential GM farmer is liable. If the GM 
farmer causes damages to the non-GM farmer, he has to pay compensation payments  at 
the rate of the damage. The damage could be caused on more than one farm.
iG
cp
5 The 
compensation payment sets incentives for the GM farmer to undertake managing and fencing 
practices that reduce the damages. The value of GM farming therefore will be reduced by the 
compensation payments and the fencing costs. The value of non-GM farming will remain the 
same since possible economic losses are fully compensated for by the GM farmer.  
iN N
vc v=A
i
i
cp f v v
 (9a) 
i i iG G G
vc v cp f= − −A  (9b) 
If the expected compensation payments for economic damages and/or the fencing costs 
exceed the value of GM production, G i G Ni i i+ > − 0i i iG G Nvc vc v or ∆ ≡ − <A A
n n
N
n n
N
A A
N
A A
                                                
, GM crops 
will be prevented from being grown.  
2.4 A Definition of Co-Existence 
The previous discussion about co-existence now allows us to define the term co-existence:  
“A state described by a set of policies exogenous to the farmers that results in the planting 
of ‘organic and/or non-organic-non-GM’ and ‘GM crops’ at the same point in time in a 
pre-defined region with at least one farm where  and one where  
under a GM farmer property right system and at least one farm where  and one 
where  under a non-GM farmer property right system.” 
i iG
vc vc>
i iG N
vc vc<
i iG
vc vc>
i iG
vc vc<
The definition of co-existence includes exogenous policies such as ex-ante regulations and ex-
post liability rules. So far, we have not discussed how those policies do affect the value of co-
 
5  For simplicity we assume that the source of GM-pollen can be clearly identified, a system similar to the 
German one with total liable adhesion. The quality of our results does not change, if we assume that a group 
of farmers will be held liable, such as under the Danish system, only the compensation payment per GM 
farmer will be reduced. 
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existence. For the analysis we will assume that the property right is with the non-GM farmer, 
meaning to say he has the right to plant non-GM crops and farmers planting GM crops have 
to compensate and/or prevent damages to non-GM farmers. This system reflects the current 
situation in the EU. 
3 Ex-Ante Regulation and Ex-Post Liability 
3.1 Co-Existence Value under Ex-Ante Regulation and Ex-Post Liability Rules 
The starting point is the definition of the GM farmer’s value function under ex-ante regulation 
and ex-post liability rules. The value function of the GM farmer will be affected as complying 
with regulations and the possibility of facing ex-post liability for damages from cross 
pollination adds additional costs to those farmers that plant GM crops. The value of planting 
GM crops at farm i can now be defined as the value from GM cultivation, G G Gi i ip y c− , minus 
the costs related to liability and its control, λi. The co-existence value of GM farming under 
ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability: 
n
iG G G Gi i i
vc p y c iλ= − −A  (10) 
The expected costs related to liability are the sum of the costs of respecting ex-ante 
regulations, ri, and the value of ex-post tort liability tli: 
(i iE r tl )iλ = + . (11) 
The regulatory costs introduced in equation (11), ri, are the sum of the fencing and 
compensation costs in equation (9b) under certainty and λi the sum including legal 
uncertainty. Following Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson (1990) equation (11) can be written as 
i i itl d jiµ= ⋅ ⋅   (12) 
where, µi is the probability of causing an accident, in this case contamination of the 
neighbouring non-GM fields, di is the monetary value of the damage, and ji is the probability 
that the injurer will pay the damages. In our case, ji, can be interpreted as a function of the 
court’s view and the probability of being sued by the neighbour who has suffered damage. 
From the previous equations the co-existence value function for the GM farmer can be 
formulated as follows: 
n ( ) ( ), ( , ) , (
i iG G i i i i
vc v r s reg s reg d s reg j lawµ= − −A )  (13) 
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where s is the size of GM crops planted, reg is the enforced GM legal standard for the region 
(e.g. country or federal state) and law is the tort liability system of the region. 
Interpreting the variable reg as the minimum distance, z, one of the most common forms of 
ex-ante regulation, between the GM crop and the neighbouring non-GM crop we can write 
equation (11) as:  
n ( ) ( ), ( , ) , (
i iG G i i i i
vc v r s z s z d s z j lawµ= − −A )  (14) 
A profit maximizing farmer i would adopt GM crops if n n 0
i i iG G N
vc vc v∆ ≡ − >A A .  
3.2 Introducing Irreversibility and Uncertainty 
In the previous discussion it was assumed that incremental benefits are certain and the farmer 
did not face reduced costs while deciding to adopt the GM technology. However, it could be 
the case that some of the costs are irreversible: for example, the GM crop requires specific 
machinery or the GM cultivation could make it difficult for the farmer to switch back to the 
non-GM status. These difficulties could include additional practices for the control of 
volunteers or a required minimum number of years of non-GM cultivation for a field to be 
considered for producing non-GM products. The multi-period time frame also adds 
uncertainty to the farmers’ adoption decision as future yields, prices and costs are not 
generally known with certainty as well as flexibility regarding adoption timing of GM crops. 
In the presence of net-irreversible costs, uncertainty and flexibility, the value of a GM crop 
is not simply the difference between the present value of future benefits and costs but the sum 
of this difference plus the value of the option to plant GM crops (Wesseler 2003). More 
formally, when some costs are irreversible, costs and benefits are uncertain and the decision 
to adopt can be postponed, a profit maximizing farmer maximizes the option value of the 
adoption possibility. Hence, we can write for the adoption decision under irreversibility, 
temporal uncertainty and flexibility excluding ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules, 
with ∼ indicating the value of co-existence under irreversibility, temporal uncertainty, and 
flexibility: 
k( ) k ( )max ( , )i i i i t T TG G G N
T
F vc E vc v v e dt IR eρ ρ
∞
− − −
i
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∆ = ∆ −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∫  (15) 
or including ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules: 
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k( ) k ( ) ( )max , , ,i i i i t T TG G G N i i
T
F vc E vc v v r tl e IR eρ ρ
∞
− − −
i
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∆ = ∆ −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∫
A A A  (16) 
where IRi and iIR
A  are the net-irreversible costs respectively and ρ the discount rate. 
There is some potential controversy about what we mean by net-irreversible costs. IRi 
indicate the net-irreversible costs, the difference between irreversible costs Ii and irreversible 
benefits Ri, of farmers who adopt GM crops. Both, Ii and Ri, are those at the private level and 
include sunk costs such as new machinery for higher density planting of herbicide tolerant soy 
beans or positive health benefits due to a change in pesticide use (Weaver and Wesseler 
2004). iIR
A  indicates the net-irreversible costs under regulation and liability rules. iIR
A  
includes in addition to IRi irreversible transaction costs, tciIR , that may arise due to 
negotiations with neighbouring farmers.6  
tc
i i iIR IR IR= +A  (17) 
with 
0, 1,...,i i iIR I R i k= − > ∀ =  (17a) 
0, 1,...,tc tc tci i iIR I R i= − > ∀ = k  (17b) 
The uncertainty that in combination with the net-irreversible costs creates the option value for 
adopting GM crops is represented by the following stochastic process: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i iG i G i G i G id vc r vc r dt vc r dz vc r dqα σ∆ − = ∆ − + ∆ − + ∆ −A A A A i
)
                                                
 (18) 
where  evolves under a combined geometric Brownian motion and Poisson 
process. α is the drift of the Brownian motion, dz is the increment of a Wiener process, dt is 
the marginal increment in time and dq
( iG ivc r∆ −A
i is the increment of a Poisson process. The first two 
terms on the right-hand-side of equation (18) are common for modelling incremental benefits 
of GM crops under irreversibility and uncertainty (e.g. Demont, Wesseler, and Tollens 2004; 
Morel et al. 2003; Wesseler 2003). The third term represents tort liability modelled as the risk 
of a jump in the profit when the farmer is held liable. More precisely, 
 
 
6  Some of the transaction costs are assumed to be irreversible. If farmers move out of planting GM crops e.g, 
time and money spent on arrangements with neighbours to comply with and reduce regulatory and liability 
costs are worthless. 
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tdz dtε= , and  
0 with probability 1- dt
- with probability dt
i
i
i i
dq
γ
φ γ
⎧= ⎨⎩  (19) 
where εt is normally distributed with zero mean and unit standard deviation, γi is the mean 
arrival rate of a Poisson process, and φi the percentage of the ex-post liability costs of 
.  ( )iG ivc r∆ −A
From the above equation and the opportune boundary conditions the standard rule for the 
adoption decision under irreversibility and uncertainty, assuming φ = 1, can be derived (Dixit 
and Pindyck 1994):7
( ) ( )* 1
1
(
1
i
i i
i
G i G i i i ivc r vc r IR
β ρ α γβ
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤∆ − > ∆ − = − +⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
A A ) A  (20) 
Equation (20) says adopt GM crops if the current incremental co-existence value of GM 
farming,  minus the regulatory costs  are greater than the hurdle value . 
This hurdle value depends among others on the regulatory and liability costs as they have an 
impact on the irreversible transaction costs and due to tort liability an impact on 
iG
vc∆ A ir *iG ivc r⎡ ⎤∆ −⎣ ⎦A
iγ . 
Please note, we get a farm specific hurdle rate, even if the drift and variance rate of the 
geometric Brownian motion are homogenous over all farms as the mean arrival rate of the 
Poisson process is farm specific and depends on the landscape and number and distance of 
non-GM farms in the neighbourhood. 
With the now specified decision rule of adopting GM crops considering ex-ante regulatory 
and ex-post liability costs under irreversibility and uncertainty, we can have a closer look at 
the co-existence issue and regional agglomeration. 
 
                                                 
7  φi is assumed to be 1 to derive an analytical solution. Using a different value for φi requires finding a solution 
numerically. 
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4 Adoption and Spatial Agglomeration Effects under Irreversibility and 
Uncertainty 
4.1 Adoption Effects 
To see the effects of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules on adoption and regional 
agglomeration we start by looking at the initial situation without any irreversibility and 
uncertainty. This situation is depicted in Figure 1. The horizontal axis illustrates the benefits 
for farmers staying non-GM and the vertical axis the benefits for becoming a GM farmer. 
Point A1 indicates a situation where the incremental benefits from planting non-GM crops for 
farmer a are positive ( )a aN Gv v> , whereas at point B1 the incremental benefits from GM crops 
for farmer b are positive ( . Point C)b bG Nv v> 1 indicates the comparative advantage of those 
two farms under coexistence. As the incremental benefits of farmer b are larger than the 
incremental benefits of farmer a point C1 is above the 45°-degree line indicating a 
comparative advantage for farmer b.  
 
Figure 1:  Distribu
ex-ante 
 
,G Gv v  
 1B*
 
 
tion of adopter and non-adopters without net-irreversible costs and 
regulation and ex-post liability 
1A*
1C*  
a b
,
a bN N
v v  
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The situation changes with the introduction of irreversibility and uncertainty as depicted in 
Figure 2. Irreversibility and uncertainty at the production level have the following 
implications. Incremental benefits from GM crops are reduced due to the irreversibility and 
uncertainty effect (the value of waiting). This is illustrated by a vertical downward movement 
of farmer b from point B1 to point B2. If farmer a is not affected the new comparative 
advantage is at point  which is still above the 45°-degree line. But it is also reasonable to 
assume that farmer a would face irreversibility and uncertainty as well if s/he would consider 
adopting GM crops. Hence, under irreversibility and uncertainty the benefits of farmer a for 
staying non-GM do increase. This is indicated by a horizontal move from point A
2
/w oC
1 to point A2. 
The new comparative advantage is indicated by point . This point is located below the 45°-
degree line. Now, the comparative advantage has moved from GM farmer b to the non-GM 
farmer a. This effect is independent of ex-ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs and has 
already been studied for the adoption of GM crops (e.g. Demont, Wesseler, and Tollens 2004; 
Morrel et al., 2003; Scatasta, Wesseler, and Demont 2006). 
2
wC
 
 
Figure 2:  D
c
β
 1B*
 
istribution of adopter and non-adopters with net-irr
osts and without ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability
1A  
*
1C*  
2B*  
2A*
2
/C  
*
w o
 
2C* w
( )
1
, ba bG G IRv v ρ αβ− −−  
β 
eversible production 
 
( )
1
,aa bN NIRv vρ αβ −−+  
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Now, if the GM farmer is liable for possible damages, s/he will only be willing to plant GM 
crops as long as the costs for complying with the regulations does not exceed the incremental 
value of GM production. The new situation is depicted in Figure 3. Again, we can observe 
two main effects. First, ex-ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs increase the hurdle value 
of adoption. This is indicated by a downward vertical move from point B2 to point B3. Please 
note, planting GM crops is still profitable for farmer b. Second, the value of staying non-GM 
either remains the same or further increases.  
 
 
Figure 3
If the no
ante regu
GM farm
remains 
. In 3 /w oC
β A
 :  Distribution of adopter and non-adopters with
costs under ex-ante regulation and ex-post liabili
n-GM farmer is surrounded by GM farms only, the fa
latory and/or ex-post liability costs if s/he becomes a
er left who could claim the right for producing non-G
at point A2 and the comparative advantage for staying
case there are other non-GM farmers in the neighbou
3C* w
3
/C  
*
w o
 
1B*
 
1A  
*
1C*  
2B*  
2A  
*
2
/C  
*
w o
 
2C* w
3A  
*
3B  
*  
( )
1
, ba bG G b bIRrv v ρ α λβ− − −−−  
β A 
 net-irreversible production 
ty 
rmer does not have to bear ex-
 GM farmer. There is no non-
M crops. In this case farmer a 
 non-GM is indicated by point 
rhood switching to GM crops 
( )
1
,
a bN a a a N
IRrv vρ α λβ − −−+ +  
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adds additional compliance costs for farmer a. Hence, the benefits of staying non-GM further 
increase as indicated by point A3. The comparative advantage for the non-GM farmer further 
increases as indicated by the move to the right from point  to point . 3 /w oC
3
wC
It is important to recognize, that liability increases the irreversible costs due to additional 
negotiation costs. Every unit of irreversible costs demands more than one unit of incremental 
benefits. Regulation and liability rules have two effects on potential adopters. First, 
regulations directly decrease the incremental benefits (see equation (16)). The adoption rate 
would decrease even without ex-post liability. Second, ex-post liability increases the hurdle 
rate as 0
1
β γβ
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ >  and this further increases the required incremental benefits for 
adoption. 
Figure 3 clearly shows that ex-ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs for GM farmers 
reduce the adoption of the technology and favours non-GM farming. The opposite can be 
shown to hold for providing the GM farmer with the property right of planting GM crops. The 
effect can be explained by using Figure 2. If the fencing costs of the non-GM farmer are 
equivalent to the irreversibility effect at production level then farmer a would move back 
from point A2 to point A1. The comparative advantage in the case of the production right is 
with the GM farmer and the point illustrating the situation is point . 2 /w oC
4.2 Agglomeration Effects 
The rules and regulations governing co-existence set incentives for the GM farmer to 
collaborate with neighbours to reduce ex-ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs. Consider 
Figure 4 which is a comparison between the benefits and costs before and after the 
introduction of regulation and liability.  
The horizontal axis represents non-GM farms with 0
a aN G
v v− >  and the vertical axis GM 
farms with . Any point in the first quadrant indicates the situation between a non-
GM and GM farm. All points above (below) the 45°-degree line indicate situations where the 
incremental benefits of the GM (non-GM) farmer are larger than the incremental benefits for 
the non-GM (GM) farmer.  
0
b bG N
v v− >
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5 Conclusions 
The difference in the distribution of property rights can explain the different rates of adoption 
of GM crops. In the US where the property right of planting is with the GM farmer, a 
relatively high rate of adoption can be observed. In the EU the property right of planting is 
with the non-GM farmer. Several countries such as Denmark and Germany have adopted a 
policy combining ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability rules to govern the planting of GM 
crops. Our analysis shows how current regulations and liability rules increase the irreversible 
costs of adoption and hence decrease the potential adoption of the technology. This has 
important implications for countries that still consider whether or not they should introduce 
GM crops and how the planting of the crops should be governed. 
The difference in incremental benefits and costs between GM and non-GM farmers 
provide incentives for regional agglomeration of either GM or non-GM farms. We show that 
the incremental benefits for becoming a GM farmer need to increase due to the irreversibility 
effect of the ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability rules compared to a situation without 
regulations and liability rules. Minimum distance requirements between non-GM and GM 
farms increases the minimum farm size necessary for adopting the technology and therefore 
has a farm size effect as already pointed out by Beckmann (2005). The irreversibility effect of 
ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability rules increase the costs of minimum distance policies 
and hence increase the minimum farm size for adoption. 
The question to what extent ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability do prevent the adoption 
of GM crops in Europe is an empirical one. We have provided with our analysis a theoretical 
framework that can be used for such an empirical study.  
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